BEiiing Through Rasses: Democracy Cannot Tame China By Harry Harding There is an increasing drumbeat for pushing a democraticproject in China to * fend off its inevitable aggressiveauthoritarian ambitions. There is little doubt that China willwish to become a preeminent4 power in its own hemisphere.But the argument that creating a pluralistic, democraticsystem in China will sideline7 a coming clash betweenWashington and BEIjing is overly optimistic. Certainly it istrue that China and the United States will be competitors, even rivals, not only because one is an established powerand the other a rising power, but also because their politicalsystems embody very different ideologies. American conceptsof democracy pose an existential threat to the Communistregime; Successful Chinese growth under an authoritariansystem is a threat to American leadership and exceptionalism.
Recently, * Aaron Friedberg8 masterfully combined, in away that is quite unusual, realist and non-realist componentsin an argument whose crescend is that 'it is likely thata more democratic China would ultimately create a morepeaceful, less war-prone environment in Asia.' It would also, of course, simultaneously remove the threat to the American
Currently in promoting the cause of democracy in China, in order to resist the inevitable momentum of a strong authoritarian pressing desire, the clamor of the slowly crescendos strong. China wants its hemisphere in a prominent influential powers, which is little doubt, however, that in China to create a pluralistic democracy in Washington and Beijing to avoid facing conflict, this view too optimistic. There is no doubt that China and the United States are competitors, and even rival, which is recognized not only because a large country, and the other is the rising power, but also because the political system contains two distinct consciousness form of U.S. democratic ideals of the communist regime constitute a threat to the existing; authoritarian regime in China's economic success under the leadership of the United States and exceptionalism is a threat.
Recently, Alan Friedberg to a rather unusual point of view in a clever way of combining realism and non-realistic elements, its main thrust is to say, 'a more democratic China is likely to end in Asia create a more peaceful, less vulnerable to a war environment. 'Of course, this way, the American sense of ideological supremacy. Thus' in the long run, theUnited States can learn to live with a democratic China asthe dominant power in East Asia, much as Great Britaincame to accept America as the preponderant power in theWestern Hemisphere. 'But,' until that day, Washingtonand Beijing are going to remain locked in an increasinglyintense struggle for mastery in Asia. '
This is an argument that has been made before.It 's one of the rosy forecasts that Jim Mann has called a 'soothing scenario.' And it is fraught with uncertainty.It is, in fact, highly unlikely that China will become a trulydemocratic political system , and moreover a democratizingMiddle Kingdom may well beoverwhelmed by the nationalisticsentiments that are part of China'scontemporary political culture. Evenif we arbitrarily and optimistically * assign a 50 percent probability toeach of these outcomes, over thenext decade * or so, that mean's thatthe chances of a Chinese regime thatis both democratic and cooperativewould be no more than 25 percent.Those are not the best of odds. Norare these odds of true democratizationwithin our ability to change.
Given this, it is far more importantto ask the fundamental question of howthe United States can manage China'srise through its own behavior. Which leads us to some of the policy implications that those others who * cling to thedemocratization-as-solution mantra might be better servedby drawing.
Rather than simply hoping for democratization, I would look toward creating greater economic *, ideological superiority will be followed to eliminate the threat. Thus, 'the long term, the United States can learn as East Asia's number one power with a democratic China of peaceful coexistence , as the British gradually accept U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere, like. 'However,' in that day before the arrival in Washington and Beijing will continue to fight for control over Asia increasingly fierce struggle among the. '
Been raised prior to this view, which is Jimu Man known as the 'happy situation' one of the optimistic forecast. And this view is full of variables. In fact, China is highly unlikely to implement a truly democratic political system. In addition, a democratic China may be overwhelmed by nationalist sentiment. Nationalism is the political culture of contemporary China as part of the subjective and optimistic even if we put these results in the next decade or so likely to occur are set at 50%, then it means that the Chinese regime has become both democratic and cooperative the possibility of not more than 25%, which is not the most likely scenario, the change in our ability to achieve within the (Chinese) real democratization is not the most likely scenario.
For this reason, it is particularly important to make such a fundamental question: How can the U.S. deal with China by the rise of their own behavior? For those who insist on repeatedly refers to 'the democratic system to solve the problem by' people, we are here to make policy recommendations point: draw Gua asked for them may be a better way.
In my opinion, but expect to send their democratic reforms, it would be better in China, the U.S. and other Asian countries interdependence between China, the United States and therest of Asia. The Communist party is.dependent on economicgrowth for legitimacy - and that growth presently depends verymuch on exports, and exports depend very much on forEigninvestment. The policy of economic rebalancing that BEIjingis attempting may change those ratios somewhat, makingthe Chinese economy increasingly dependent on domesticconsumption and less reliant on exports, and exports morecontingent on Chinese firms and less on foreign investedones. But as the economy matures, there will also be increasinginterest in outbound Chinese foreign investment, and that willincrease Beijing's interdependence with the rest of the world - albeit in a different form. This creates an environment in whichAmerican can promote interdependence based on reciprocity.Actively welcome Chinese investment in the United States, aslong as comparable opportunities are available for American (and other foreign) firms in China. Chineseinvestment in an advanced economy likethat of the United States will mean. thatChinese goods sold stateside wil1 beincreasingly produced by American - notChinese - workers. Concomitantly, it willgive those Chinese firms with investmentsin the United States a * stake in stablerelations between Washington and Beijing.
Second, continue to welcomeChina's growing presence within existinginternational institutions - like the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations - and its efforts tocreate new organizations to meet unfilled needs - like theSCO, the ASEAN +3 and the East Asian Summit- -as long asthe United States is also given an appropriate role. There is ahuge difference between a rising power that wants more saywithin the existing international system and a rising power thatwants to promote fundamental changes to that system. It willbe key to ensure that those institutions - both old and new - are robust enough to simultaneously impose some constraintson Chinese behavior and reassure Beijing that its rise is beingaccommodated.
Above all, the United States needs to maintain a favorable * balance of power in the region. China may wish to dominate