Essentialism of analysis

Kripke Essentialism

Kripke's inevitable really

Important representatives of modern essentialism Kripke He believes that not only there is necessarily true, but more important is that the inevitable really exist about the object.

Kripke proposed the existence of necessary truth about the object is mainly referring to the same statement is inevitable really, that "the proper name of the same statement, he wrote:" If they have always been true, then they may not not necessarily. "This includes the form" X is X "in the form (for example," Kripke Kripke "), but also the form" X is Y "form (for example, the" Evening Star " "Morningstar").

2 What is essentialism

"Essentialism" has several different meanings:

(1) the meaning of a (non-analytical)

"Essentialism" meaning right and wrong, that there is an inevitable truth, it really does not depend on the sentence (or proposition) analysis.

(2) the meaning of 2 (not the meaning of the word)

The essentialism second layer of meaning that it is not the meaning of words but rather there is inevitably true, it really refers to the way in this world or the world of what had to be.

(3) the meaning of

The third meaning essentialism refers to the existence of necessary truth about the object or objects. Quine says Aristotle's essentialism "some of the attributes of an object theory, may be considered to be the essence of an object" "essentialism" including at least two different perspectives on a third meaning.

First, the object (3a)

There is necessarily true, this does not depend on how it is assigned a true value. Said and Quine inevitability demonstration relative presence of a necessarily true type statement about the object or objects, is often used in the past such independent sentence to express them, That is, even in the presence of such a sentence could be used to express their meaning can not guarantee their true value if it is considered that this type statement, there is the problem is that these types presented can be analytic proposition expressed in this layer of meaning (3a) some people may be essentialist, but not on the first layer or the second layer of meaning - but on the contrary, an agreement commentators is to insist that all necessary truth (inevitable really this type of statement) of their true attributed to the given sentence is the meaning of the analysis or the meaning of this word.

"Object" and "object" of these two words is very vague, and essentialism layer 3a, meaning it is easy to confuse the two different points of view, it is divided into a section 3b layer of meaning.

Second, the meaning of Rule 3b-layer (Shuxiang particulars)

Essentialism in Rule 3b meaning advocates there About the Shuxiang necessarily true, special like to be seen as an example of the "object" (typical objects) and the most simple description of the object in the real world. Positivist that allowing open Shuxiang necessarily true, they think about the Shuxiang the unrestricted general proposition (how all Xs expression whenever and wherever they are Y, which the Xs may exist) analysis , or in other words, this form of propositions or statements can be seen as an inevitable truth, instead of essentialism l or Layer 2 has the same meaning and there, however, we may be more suitable to call these propositions or statements are statements about the kinds of objects, essentialism refers meaning of Rule 3b meaning essentialism, that some people in this case there are really about individual Shuxiang inevitable. might very easily be seen as in a the 3a layer of meaning on essentialism, rather than as a Rule 3b meaning essentialism, which upholds the existence of necessary truth about the object rather than about individuals Shuxiang necessarily true.

, Kripke weakening "the inevitably true" meaning

In the the Kripke early work, he redefined "necessarily true" is this:

This, let us to the inevitability of a weak explanation. Matter what time I have referred to the object, and at this moment, then we can get a statement seen as inevitable, this statement should be true.

Even in the presence of it may not be true context, like "objects mentioned in this moment" does not exist, then this definition statement can also be seen as "inevitable really." and in the old meaning "really anyway are true" This statement is also included in the "necessarily true" within the meaning of, sometimes there is more weak "necessarily true" concept: That is, if it is true, then the same statement is considered inevitable.

What is the meaning of Kripke is an essentialist

Kripke in which a layer of meaning is a problem of essentialism is very complicated, in fact, he not only redefined "must be true", and based on this fact, his point of view on the statement seems to have two different The defense, especially in the same statement that he "must be true" that he defined "necessarily true" meaning "inevitable really.

(1) Kripke old - defined by defense

One defense is really the same statement regarded it true due to the self-explanatory really "what is" or "an object is what it is and not other objects.

(2) Kripke new - defined by defense

The same statement is inevitable that this kind of statement should first look at Kripke, he's like "two proper names" may also have noticed that his point of view does not seem to take into account the inevitability argument Quine This makes this point of view, any object, its words alleged by an inevitable alleged by one is not necessarily the alleged allegations it different phrases a significant inference, where by a "two specially same statement in the name, "said it can be to be re-expressed the same object can not specifically name the phrase to refer to. between proper names the same statement" is assumed to be inevitable, when same object allegations did not use proper names when they express the truth (Kripke advocates object necessarily true expression) should be regarded as not all are necessarily true on the surface, That, at least, on even in Kripke weaker meaning, on the same statement, he necessarily advocate is complex.

Kripke seems, according to the statement does not contain a strict directive to handle the type of statement the expression is different from the strict directives as necessary truth detection or other standard of truth statements of the type represented by this statement is true, then will inevitably true all Shuxiang and non-task like, can be used to put in the "Yes" on each side the same strict directive (the name of the object) to represent, so that, for example, "Kripke < <name and the inevitability >> author "can be interpreted as" Kripke Kripke "In this way, all really the same statement can be counted as defined by Kripke necessity "under the meaning must be true.

(3) Kripke meaning "inevitable true" and essentialism

If we accept Kripke redefine "necessarily true", he claims 3a and 3b meaning essentialism: In this meaning, he inevitably true both about the object, but also including special like his point of view in the first meaning of essentialism: his inevitable really is beyond true addition can be analysis of the proposition expressed, but also like Kripke Kripke Such a form of expression (forcing their meaning they are not expressed in all contexts true, but only when "in this moment is mentioned object exists" when the expression of true) in the meaning of the second layer argument whether the Kripke as essentialism is not very clear, because he seems like the same like two proper names he defined necessarily true statements are classified as The reason is that the meaning of words is a particular kind of meaning that is the kind mentioned at this moment, it must express a truth.

According to this point of view, to treat Kripke Kripke "this sentence or proposition it expresses an inevitable really the type stated reason seems this sentence or proposition" Kripke Kerry Puck "must express a true statement, because it provides a" this object exists in this moment mentioned is Kripke already have an alleged and the alleged existence.

(4) the inevitable true and essentialism Kripke

Kripke Old necessarily true meaning (that is true in any case true) is an essentialist answer to this question is not very clear, because it is not considered, but in true in any case are true "meaning, contains information about the individual task like statements are watching is inevitable really, he did not provide a reasonable argument, and in his old meaning seems to not necessarily true statements (same Shuxiang statement) as inevitable really, Kripke expanded "necessarily true" meaning we may infer, Kripke not in layer 3b meaning, Shuxiang is true, is necessarily true of essentialism as "necessarily true" meaning of his early set up we can not reasonably guess, this old-fashioned sense of inevitable really based on whether he believed analysis of the sentence or the meaning of words In other words, whether he believed that the meaning of the first layer (not analysis) or in the second meaning (not the meaning of the word ') essentialism in his right. posted in the free papers Download Center

Second, the amendment of the Agreement on

1, the correction of the relationship between the "analysis" and "necessarily true"

We have seen the positivist development agreement on position is untenable. Alleged new work also proved that any type of statement can be used to express non-analytical proposition in order to retain a class is analytic proposition is defined as the inevitable truth, so they must be opened distinguish from these types of statements, that some be an analytic proposition expressed by (such as a statement containing a significance force it to always express true statement) and contrary to the premise of the inevitability argument Quine, not all of the statements, but only in the usual sense of that is inevitably true statement, to an analysis of the proposition expressed. therefore inevitable really the type of presentation and analysis of the proposition The relationship of this amendment, provide a clear and acceptable to the the meaningful token statements into expression inevitable really the type of statements and these can not express necessarily true type statement.

In this way, the mark statement can be divided into no sense, meaningful, and is divided into the proposition, which is the same and not the same sense of the word manufacturer should be able to divide these into containing a significance so that they in all contexts have expressed really (Analysis proposition) and these may not express the true (non-analytic proposition). former (analytic proposition) should have expressed inevitable really, thus any such mark sentences - that it represents can be informed by the word word maker that any analysis of the proposition represented by the same type of statement - can also be used to express necessarily true.

Inevitable really this kind of treatment, in this sense, is considered Agreement commentators, that really inevitable truth is by word meaning / statement analysis dominated and they do not have a say about the "world in the object ". convention on the traditional doctrine" essentialism "Sometimes is compatible to these significant convention doctrine defined, so the so-called" modified agreement 'statement , can not be considered in each layer of the meaning of the word "essentialism" items are nonessential doctrine.

Kripke view already mentioned, is generally regarded as essentialism, the meaning of the second layer (not the meaning of words) may be seen as is unessential doctrine, but he includes some inevitable really the true value of the type of statement beyond the range normally used in a After a careful consideration of the "is inevitably true" meaning "weakening" reached, a statement that talked about the object may not exist at this time can not exclude them from the "inevitable really this kind of statement, this new rule is a statement on the same task like identify the inevitable in this new sense true method is to see the object as long as it comes to there, strict directive contains nothing but the statement used to represent them, whether it has a meaning so that they have to express true.

Kripke left an open question, we need to achieve by changing the "necessarily true" meaning of this method should retain the traditional "necessarily true" meaning, which means "true in any case are true, and by a containing a significance to promote it in all contexts have to express true this statement is analytic proposition.

2, on a "comprehensive" fix

On "analysis" and "necessarily true" relationship between correction produce a result that is inevitably true statement may be provided by a non-analytical proposition to express, and this problem, that is, whether these non-analytical proposition should is called "integrated".

In the the Agreement On heyday of positivism, I believe that all meaningful propositions either analysis - inevitable really - a priori, either integrated - accidental - experienced, "synthetic propositions" processing:
A, who is not a meaningful analysis of the proposition.
B, accidental proposition / statement.
If this number is 9 like "The current number of planets is greater than 7" this proposition, not analysis (its significance can not force it had to express true), but it expressed inevitable rather than accidental statement., And thus it expresses statements and 9 is greater than 7 is an expression of the same types of statements, it expressed necessarily true if the number is 5, it will express an inevitable false statement if this category proposition is classified as the traditional link between the "integrated", then the "accidental" and "comprehensive" disappeared: so we will be inevitable rather than incidental "comprehensive" proposition expressed other methods such Proposition divided is not integrated, because they do not express the accidental representations.

In this case, neither analysis nor meaningful comprehensive proposition all (meaningful) proposition "analysis" and "comprehensive pure positivism distinguish collapsed" These words are still together exclusion (no statement containing a single meaning, can both analysis, and comprehensive), but they are not exhaustive (meaningful) proposition.

Therefore, in the process, we can use the "non-analytical" lexical items, it seems wise to use it to refer to is not analysis (meaningful) proposition, and "comprehensive" reserved for this proposition subclass, namely the significance of making them the expression (or expression) an occasional statement that its true value depends on whether the world is a statement of what this Agreement theory can not be turned simplistic positivism in these cases be saved, because it negates the researchers described the alleged complexity, and with the deepening of this research work, the proposition may be more refined and more complex classification, and not just into misleading analysis "and" comprehensive ".

Third, the evaluation of essentialism

Kripke essential attribute with occasional attribute in the properties of things, how to distinguish the attributes of the essence of things, he proposed two views: One is that the origin of an individual (or it used to constitute the material) for the individual is the essence, he said: "the origin of an object for this object is essentially, the manufacture of the substance of an object for this object is also essential that the essence of a class of individuals all individuals have the inherent nature of that kind, it makes that kind of membership has such an appropriate internal structure essentially depends on he pointed out: "In general, scientific attempt through the study of a kind basic structural features to find the kind of nature, to find the essence of the philosophical sense of the kinds. "[1] 97-105
According to Kripke, across the world to identify, for the individual, we look at its origins or its constituent material for the species, we examine its internal structure, which will be able to determine its nature, which by the nature of identification of transboundary whether an individual is the same individual. should be said that the help of essentialism, Kripke solved the same and identify the problems of cross-border individual.

For essentialism philosopher Quine is rejection of Quine's rejection of essentialism one of the most important reasons is the so-called "mathematician rider paradox": mathematicians necessarily the reasoning ability, and not necessarily necessarily have two legs, the rider is on two legs, but not necessarily, reasoning ability, mathematics as a hobby and hobbies cycling individual, relative to the hobby mathematical reasoning ability is essential, in terms relative to the hobby cycling, reasoning ability Duality This means that the rider as a mathematician, reasoning ability both essence and duality, empathy two legs both duality and the nature of [1] 112 can be seen, Quine's view, the "essence" or "essential attributes" of the so-called things or objects are relative, the individual must have "essentially property "does not exist, since the things or objects" essence "or" essential attribute does not exist, of course, also rejects essentialism.

Quinn see the essence of things or objects or essential attribute relative uncertainty, which is a grain of truth, indeed, the essence or essential attribute of a particular object is not absolutely fixed constant, but relative Meanwhile, the object or the nature of things, or essential attribute is not the only, but diverse, but can not because of this negative things or objects on the essence or essential attribute addition, things or objects have no essential or essential attribute Can we correct understanding of the nature of things or objects or essential attribute are two different things, not difficult to recognize because of the nature and essence of the thing or object attributes relative, diversity, essence or essential attribute negative things or objects.

The nature or essence of the thing or object property is specific, absolute, Kripke's view, that the origin of the individual or constituent material, the internal structure of the kind common in all individuals is by its very nature, from the relatively point of view, in a different context, the same thing or object may have different aspects of the call upon, and thus the nature or essential attribute in different contexts so, the nature or essential attribute of the object is not the only, and can diverse. purpose we determine the nature or essence of the object attributes in order to carry out cross-border distinguish objects, as long as the essentially open to the individual and other individual differences, making it their object, as commodity paste on a label, the label is not the object, but to the object and other objects of the difference between open when we purchase goods, buy goods, and the label is to identify the object, as to whether the label and the nature of the object match, this seems to be the least important is that it meets our needs on the line. posted in the free papers Download Center

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